Djibouti to Ethiopia: “We’re Not the Crimea of Africa”

Djibouti to Ethiopia: “We’re Not the Crimea of Africa”

Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed bids farewell to Djibouti President Ismail Omar Guelleh at Bole International Airport on March 29, 2022. (Photo: ENA)

 Djibouti’s President Guelleh rejects naval base proposal and reaffirms national sovereignty.

Original article in Italian: AffarItaliani

Djibouti’s President Ismail Omar Guelleh has firmly rejected Ethiopia’s proposal to establish a naval base on Djiboutian territory, stating that his country does not intend to become “the Crimea of the Horn of Africa.”

In a recent interview with Jeune Afrique, Guelleh, 77, in power since 1999, clarified that while Djibouti is open to commercial use of its port infrastructure by Addis Ababa, any form of exclusive concession or foreign—especially Ethiopian—military presence is out of the question.
“The Ethiopians asked us for an extraterritorial corridor and a naval base. But that’s not what was discussed,” said the president. “We had proposed joint management of the port of Tadjourah, but their request is unacceptable.”

Tensions Rise Over Red Sea Access

The issue of sea access has reemerged as a central concern in Ethiopian foreign policy. Since Eritrea’s independence in 1991, Addis Ababa has had no direct access to the sea. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has repeatedly emphasized the strategic urgency of securing a port—even through “unconventional means”—alarming neighboring countries.

“I believe Abiy has realized this cannot be a show of force,” Guelleh added, highlighting Turkey’s constructive role in mediating tensions.

Djibouti: A Small Country with Strategic Weight
With a population just over one million, Djibouti controls the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, a vital maritime chokepoint between the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, essential for trade between Europe, Asia, and East Africa. Because of its strategic position, the country hosts military bases from the United States, France, China, Japan, and Italy—a geopolitical “umbrella” that deters regional ambitions.

During the interview, Guelleh did not rule out running for reelection in 2026, emphasizing his role as guarantor of sovereignty and national stability.

The Somaliland Dilemma and Addis Ababa’s Strategy

Tensions over sea access escalated in January 2024 when Ethiopia signed a controversial memorandum with Somaliland, a breakaway region of Somalia. The agreement allowed Ethiopian goods to transit through the port of Berbera in exchange for recognition of Somaliland’s independence and a 10-kilometer stretch of coast to build a naval base.

Backed by the UAE and its logistics company DP World, the deal aimed to reduce Ethiopia’s dependence on Djibouti’s ports, which generate around $2 billion annually for the small African republic. However, the deal provoked a strong reaction from Somalia, which called it “an attack on its sovereignty,” receiving support from Egypt. Turkey, while opposed to the Ethiopian deal, brokered an agreement with Mogadishu to halt Ethiopia’s naval expansion.

A Long History of Tension and Ambition

Ethiopia’s struggle for sea access has deep historical roots. After Eritrea’s independence, Addis Ababa used Eritrean ports only temporarily. The 2018 peace deal between Abiy Ahmed and Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki allowed only for commercial port access, firmly rejecting any military base proposal.

Nonetheless, in 2019, Ethiopia began developing its own navy—despite having no coastline—a move seen as part of a broader strategic vision. Analysts note that control of a military port is central to the Prosperity Party’s geopolitical agenda to turn Ethiopia into a regional power.

The Imperial Project and the Oromo Dream

According to multiple sources, Prime Minister Abiy’s political vision aims to create an “Oromo Empire” with access to the Red Sea. Securing a port is seen as essential to consolidating this vision, which involves Oromo dominance in the region.
Having lost Amhara support and ended his tactical alliance with Eritrea against the TPLF, Abiy has accelerated the “Oromization” of state institutions, sidelining other ethnic groups and deepening internal conflict.

Meanwhile, Ethiopia’s dream of a military port remains at the center of its government’s plans, but neighboring states—Djibouti, Eritrea, and Somalia—are firmly united in refusing to cede even a centimeter of their territory.