An Alibi for Assab? Abiy Ahmed’s Accusations and Analysts’ Fears

An Alibi for Assab? Abiy Ahmed’s Accusations and Analysts’ Fears

As Abiy Ahmed accuses Eritrea of plotting, the opposition denounces the drums of war and analysts fear that Assab may become the pretext for a new conflict.

The port of Assab, in Eritrea, has returned to the center of Ethiopia’s political debate. For Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, the loss of that outlet to the sea was a historical mistake that must be corrected. But behind this rhetoric lie a deep internal crisis, a risk of military escalation, and the complex colonial legacy of the region.

Abiy’s Statements and the Shadow of War

Last month, during a televised interview at the site of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed called the loss of Assab “a past mistake that must be corrected.” Many observers interpreted these words as an outright declaration of war.

Already in 2023, Abiy had described the Red Sea as “Ethiopia’s natural border,” an “existential issue.” Now, according to internal sources, this “existential issue” has led Ethiopia to position troops and heavy weaponry near Assab, fueling fears of an imminent attack on Eritrea.

Letter to the UN and Opposition’s Response

The tension has also translated into formal diplomatic actions. On October 2, the Ethiopian foreign minister sent a letter to UN Secretary-General António Guterres, accusing Eritrea of plotting to overthrow the Addis Ababa government in collusion with the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF).

According to several analysts, this move—following a previous letter—may be an attempt to build an alibi ahead of a potential military offensive against Assab.

Asmara replied by calling the letter a “farce” and reiterated that it was not seeking any war. The Ethiopian opposition also broke its silence. Jawar Mohammed, a prominent Oromo figure and potential rival to Abiy, responded on X, accusing the government of being “the main drum of war.”

“Let’s assume for a moment the accusation is true,” he wrote. “But what have Abiy and his regime done over the past two years? Haven’t they bragged, day after day, about their intention to crush the TPLF, overthrow Isaias, and take control of Assab?”

Until now, the question of maritime access had remained unofficial, open to journalistic interpretation. Today, official statements and letters seem to fill that void—sowing the wind and risking to reap the storm.

Abiy Ahmed’s Vision: “Synergy” and the Sea

During the launch of his book Medemer (“synergy” in Amharic), Abiy Ahmed declared that Ethiopia “cannot remain a geographical prisoner.” Medemer sums up his political vision: joining forces to foster national growth. Within this framework, energy self-sufficiency guaranteed by the GERD and access to the sea are strategic pillars.

The expression “geographical prison,” though not mentioning Assab explicitly, unsettles neighboring countries. Djibouti, Somalia, and Eritrea read between the lines a troubling message.

The situation is further complicated by a June 2025 agreement between Addis Ababa and Abu Dhabi to build a railway line between Ethiopia and Somaliland, part of the UAE’s broader expansion strategy in the Horn of Africa.

Ethiopia: Internal Crisis and Growing Discontent

While the government looks to the sea, Ethiopia’s real problems remain inland. The conflicts that began with the Tigray war have spread to the Amhara region, despite the Pretoria agreements of 2022.

General Teshome Gemechu called the conquest of Assab a “national goal.” But the internal reality tells another story. According to a report by the Military Council released by Ethio Forum, 74,000 soldiers have deserted, compared to 60,000 new recruits.

On the social front, the situation is dire. Since 2018, 73% of the population has become poorer, with 18% on the brink of extreme poverty. Over 21 million Ethiopians need humanitarian assistance. 4.7 million are internally displaced and about 9 million children are out of school.

Regional Reactions

Neighboring countries have reacted firmly and in unison. Djibouti reiterated its willingness to allow Ethiopia commercial, but not military, use of its ports. Somalia reaffirmed full sovereignty over its coasts. For now, the provisional agreement between Addis Ababa and Somaliland, which envisioned the cession of a port in exchange for formal recognition, has not progressed.

Eritrea, through its Ministry of Information, called the demand for “sovereign access to the sea” a distortion of history and an attempt to bypass international law, which protects the inviolability of inherited colonial borders.

Foreign Minister Osman Saleh, addressing the 80th UN General Assembly, stated that Eritrea is a sovereign coastal state and its ports are not open to foreign military or naval use. Guterres expressed appreciation for Eritrea’s commitment to regional stability and reaffirmed the UN’s support for territorial integrity and national sovereignty.

Meanwhile, as the Addis Ababa government raises the stakes and neighboring states stand united, the international community is also taking a stance. Massad Boulos, senior advisor to former U.S. President Donald Trump, spoke of “the importance of respecting international borders,” while Washington extended the state of emergency in Ethiopia.

Abiy Ahmed has received no support from the United States for his policy, deemed dangerous for the Horn of Africa. The UK Parliament has also debated the rising tensions, urging Addis Ababa to begin dialogue with Asmara to avoid “miscalculations” that could destabilize the entire region.

As for Italy, there has been no official statement yet on the Red Sea issue.

Historical Background

Historically, Italian presence in the Red Sea began with Giuseppe Sapeto’s purchase of the Bay of Assab on behalf of the Rubattino Navigation Company. No Abyssinian ruler took part in negotiations with Italy, nor are there documents proving Abyssinian control over the area at the time.

After Italy’s defeat at Adwa in 1896, it revised the Treaty of Wuchale signed with Menelik II, renouncing territorial claims in Ethiopia but retaining control over Eritrea—from the Mareb River to Assab.

Even today, Eritrea, like many African nations, bases its territorial sovereignty on colonial borders established in 1900, 1902, and 1908.

In 1991 Eritrea gained de facto independence and, after the 1993 referendum, de jure independence, with borders recognized by all states, including Ethiopia. These borders were not challenged even in 2018, during the signing of the Asmara and Jeddah Peace Accords.

Ethiopian arguments referring to the 1951–1991 period—when Eritrea was first federated, then annexed—do not hold up under international law. According to the legal principle of uti possidetis, sovereignty over colonial borders cannot be contested.

Between Law and Geopolitics

The only legal avenue for Ethiopia to obtain maritime access is through the Law of the Sea, which grants landlocked states the right to use foreign ports through bilateral agreements. This is a right of transit, not ownership, and Eritrea has never denied Ethiopia this possibility.

Economically, Ethiopia experienced double-digit growth between 1998 and 2018 without owning a port. Addis Ababa is actually closer to Djibouti than to Assab, keeping transit costs relatively low compared to other landlocked countries.

As Eritrea’s UN ambassador Sophia Tesfamarian put it:

“Being landlocked should be seen as a logistical challenge, not a historical injustice.”

A challenge to be addressed through commercial and diplomatic agreements, not through dangerous territorial claims—a ticking time bomb in the fragile balance of the Horn of Africa.